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This entry focuses on foundational issues in dynamic semantics and static 
semantics, specifically on what is conceptually at stake between the dynamic 
framework and the classic, truth-conditional framework, and consequently 
what kinds of evidence support each framework. The article examines two 
questions. First, it explores the consequences of taking the proposition as 
central semantic notion as characteristic of static semantics, and argues that 
this is not as limiting in accounting for discourse dynamics as many think. 
Specifically, it explores what it means for a static semantics to incorporate the 
notion of context change potential in a dynamic pragmatics and denies that this 
conception of static semantics requires that all updates to the context be 
eliminative and distributive. Second, it argues that the central difference 
between the two frameworks is whether semantics or pragmatics accounts for 
dynamic effects, and explores what this means for the oft-heard claim that 
dynamic semantics blurs the semantics/pragmatic distinction.
Keywords: dynamic semantics, static semantics, truth-conditional se-
mantics, pragmatics, context, discourse, discourse dynamics, semantics-
pragmatics distinction, dynamic pragmatics
A useful starting point is to think of classical, static semantics as taking the se-
mantic content of sentences to be propositions, which determine truth conditions,
and the semantic values of sub-sentential expressions to be their contributions to
the truth-conditions of the whole sentence. By contrast, dynamic semantics takes
updates to the conversational context as a starting point. The semantic values of
discourses, sentences, and sub-sentential expressions are what they contribute to the
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current state of the discourse, generally conceived of as context change potentials
(CCPs), which are functions from context to context, or relations between contexts.
Intuitively, they are instructions or recipes for updating the context. There is no
one concept of context that is inherent to the dynamic semantic framework, though
contexts are generally thought to be representations of the current state of the con-
versation, or the information states of the conversational participants, and not the
literal, physical environment in which the conversation takes place, and they are
richer than a Kaplanian index, which generally keeps track of only the speaker, ad-
dressee, time, place, and maybe a few other things. People disagree as to what
exactly has to be in the context, and they also disagree as to whether the context is
a sort of mental object, or an abstract, objective representation of the state of the
conversation.
Since the late 1970s, much work has been done in dynamic semantics, and it would
be impossible to canvas it all here. Some examples of the kind of data that motivates
dynamic semantics and the dynamic treatments of that data will be briefly discussed
in §1 below. This entry will not focus on the evaluation of specific theories. I will
also put aside the question of how much dynamic phenomena there is in discourse,
as well as the question of how Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) fits into the
classification of static and dynamic theories. Rather, I’ll focus on the question of what
is really at stake between the dynamic and static conceptions of semantics. In §2, I
explore the consequences of taking the centrality of the proposition as characteristic
of the static view, arguing that this is not as limiting in accounting for discourse
dynamics as many think. In §3 I propose that the difference between static and
dynamic semantics ultimately lies in whether pragmatics or semantics accounts for
discourse dynamics and what this means for claims that dynamic semantics blurs
the semantics/pragmatics distinction.
1 Data
In the beginning, dynamic semantics was primarily motivated by two phenomena:
unbound anaphora and presupposition. Since then, it has been fruitfully applied
to various other phenomena including modals, conditionals, and imperatives. It is
beyond the scope of the present paper to give a full overview or evaluation of all
the dynamic accounts of the various phenomena. This brief overview is just meant
to give the reader a feel for the dynamic semantic framework as well as a point of
reference for the discussion below.
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1.1 Presupposition
Some sentences seem to take for granted other information. For example, when
someone says (1a) they are taking for granted (1b). Call (1b) the presupposition of
(1a):
(1) a. Claudia stopped smoking.
b. Claudia used to smoke.
Presuppositions are also marked by their projection behavior, that is, some sentences
that embed other sentences with presuppositions have the same presuppositions as
the sentences they embed, while others don’t. For example (2a-b) both also presup-
pose (1b), while (2c) doesn’t:
(2) a. Claudia hasn’t stopped smoking.
b. Has Claudia stopped smoking?
c. If Claudia used to smoke, she stopped smoking.
Moreover, sentences with presuppositions display order effects ; the first in each of
the following two pairs is felicitous, while the (b) sentence is infelicitous:
(3) a. Claudia used to smoke and she stopped smoking.
b. # Claudia stopped smoking and she used to smoke.
(4) a. Claudia used to smoke. She stopped smoking.
b. #Claudia stopped smoking. She used to smoke.
The classic dynamic semantics for presupposition projection was first proposed by
Heim (1983).1 The key to Heim’s theory of presupposition is the dynamic conception
of support (also called acceptance, admittance, or satisfaction): a context supports a
sentence φ if and only if updating with φ returns the same state, that is, the content
of φ was already contained in the context. (Formally, context c supports φ iff c[φ] =
c.) The idea is that for a context to be updated with a presuppositional sentence like
(1a), the context has to support the presupposition, otherwise the update cannot
succeed. Suppose for simplicity that contexts are just sets of worlds, namely those
worlds left as open possibilities given the current state of the conversation. Here is
a sample of Heimian semantic clauses:
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Basic case: c[φ] =
{
if c supports the presuppositions of φ, c ∩ φ
undefined otherwise
}
Negation: c[¬φ] = c - c[φ] (where ‘-’ is set-subtraction)
Conjunction: c[φ and ψ] = c[φ][ψ]
Conditional: c[φ → ψ] = c - (c[φ] - c[φ][ψ])
There are a few things to note. First, as in all dynamic semantic systems, con-
junction is not commutative. Conjunction amounts to updating first with the first
conjunct and then with the second. Since conjunction and sequential sentences are
both treated the same, this explains the order effects observed in (3) and (4). Sup-
pose we begin with a context in which it is an open question whether Claudia used
to smoke. In the felicitous cases, the context is first updated with the information
that Claudia used to smoke; this is an ordinary, basic case kind of update (there are
no presuppositions to be satisfied). The context now supports the presupposition of
the second sentence, and so everything proceeds just fine. But in the second case,
the context doesn’t support the presupposition of the first sentence, and the update
crashes. The clause for negation explains why (2a) also presupposes that Claudia
used to smoke; since updating a context c with ¬φ involves updating c with φ along
the way, c has to support the presuppositions of φ. The clause for the conditional
explains why (2c) doesn’t presuppose that Claudia used to smoke. The only context
that has to support the presuppositions of the consequent (i.e. ‘Claudia stopped
smoking’) is the context c updated with antecedent, and since the antecedent just is
the presupposition of the consequent, it is guaranteed to do so.
This brings us to another important feature of dynamic semantics: dynamic
semantics distinguishes between a notion of global and local context. The global
context is just what we’ve been thinking of as the context, the state of the conver-
sation at any point. A local context is a temporary context created while processing
a larger expression. For example, in the case of Heim’s semantics for conditionals, a
local context is created by temporarily updating with the antecedent before updat-
ing with the consequent, but this update with the antecedent is not permanent — it
does not get passed on to the output context after the processing of the conditional
is complete.
1.2 Anaphora
Pronouns anaphoric on indefinites also demonstrate seemingly dynamic properties
both at the discourse and sub-sentential level. For example, in (5), the pronoun in
the (b) sentence gets its value from the indefinite ‘a woman’ , but ‘a woman’ neither
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syntactically binds the pronoun nor does it straightforwardly provide a referent, since
‘a woman’ is not a referring term:
(5) a. A woman walked in.
b. She sat down.
Furthermore, these sorts of examples exhibit order effects similar to those in the case
of presupposition (the (b) sentences in each discourse are infelicitous on a reading in
which ‘a woman’ and ‘she’ are co-indexed):
(6) a. A woman walked in and she sat down.
b. # She sat down and a woman walked in.
(7) a. A woman walked in. She sat down.
b. # She sat down. A woman walked in.
Unbound anaphora also interacts in apparently systematic ways with connectives,
quantifiers, and operators, for example, anaphora is generally unavailable when the
indefinite is embedded under negation:
(8) It’s not the case that a woman walked in. #She sat down.
Indefinites also provide values for unbound anaphoric pronouns at a sub-sentential
level, called donkey sentences after the example made famous by Geach (1962):
(9) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
(10) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
Abstracting away from the particularities of various views, on the dynamic se-
mantic framework, indefinites are generally thought to introduce discourse referents,
which then provide values for subsequent anaphoric pronouns. Adding discourse ref-
erents to the context requires that we think of contexts as more complex than just
sets of worlds; they have to include at least sets of worlds and discourse referents
(which can be modeled, for example, as sets of assignment functions). Discourse ref-
erents are not to be confused with referents, or objects in the world, but intuitively
represent something like objects for the sake of conversation (or according to the
conversation). For example, in (5), there is not necessarily a particular woman in
the world that the discourse is about, but there is, according to the conversation, a
5
single object under discussion that has the properties of being a woman, walking in
(to the contextually salient place) and sitting down. (5a) introduces a discourse ref-
erent (into the global context), call it x, which has the properties of being a woman
and walking in. The (b) sentence then tests the context, only allowing through those
values for x that also include the property of sitting down. In this way, the indefi-
nite in the first sentence dynamically (semantically) binds the pronoun in the second
sentence without syntactically binding it.2
Certain connectives, like conjunction, allow values to be passed from the first con-
junct to the second (but not vice versa, so again, conjunction is non-commutative).
Other connectives, like the negation and conditional, block anaphoric connection
between indefinite and pronoun when the indefinite occurs within the scope of the
connective and the pronoun outside of it, but license the connection when they are
both within the scope of the same connective. Another way to think about it in the
dynamic semantic framework is that indefinites in certain contexts, like unembedded
or in conjunctions, introduce discourse referents into global context. When embedded
under negation, quantification or in a conditional, they introduce discourse referents
merely into the local context but not the global context, and some (like, arguably,
disjunction), neither license discourse referents in global nor local contexts.
1.3 Epistemic modals
Epistemic modals also exhibit order effects in conjunctions and in consecutive sen-
tences, for example, where the door is opened to reveal who is behind it at the
ellipsis:
(11) a. Mary Anne might be at the door... Mary Anne is not at the door.
b. #Mary Anne is not at the door... Mary Anne might be at the door.
Furthermore, as Yalcin (2007) points out, it is not easy to treat the infelicity of
examples like (11b) pragmatically, by appealing to Moore’s paradox considerations,
because the infelicity persists when embedded under supposition:
(12) # Suppose Mary Anne is not at the door and she might be at the door.
Though Yalcin does not technically propose a dynamic semantics, his semantics
uses the tools of the traditional dynamic semantics for epistemic modals, following
Veltman (1996). In dynamic semantics, epistemic modals like ‘might’ and ‘must’ are
treated like tests on the context, where the context is taken to be a set of worlds
representing some information state (it is open whether this is the information state
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of the speaker, or some group, etc.). ‘Might φ’ tests to see if the context contains at
least one φ-world. If it does, the entire context passes through as output, unchanged.
If there is no φ-world, the update crashes, and there is no output (or the output is
the absurd state, which is empty). ‘Must φ’ tests to see if every world in the context
is a φ-world; if so, the context passes through unchanged, and if not, the update
crashes.
This explains the contrast between (11a) and (11b). Suppose it is an open possi-
bility that Mary Anne or Kristy is at the door. Then updating with (11a) proceeds
flawlessly. The first sentence tests the context for a Mary Anne at the door-world.
Since there is at least one (by hypothesis), the context is output unchanged. Then
we get the information that Mary Anne is not at the door, which changes the context
by eliminating all Mary Anne at the door-worlds. But in (11b), things are not so
smooth. The first sentence eliminates all the Mary Anne at the door-worlds, and so
when we get to the second sentence, the update crashes. This explains the infelicity
of discourse (11b).3 Add to this, as, roughly, Yalcin does, that suppose shifts the
information state to be the set of worlds compatible with the agent’s suppositions,
and we can also explain why (12) is bad, since it puts incompatible demands on the
agent’s suppositional state — the first embedded conjunct will update the state so
that there are no Mary Anne-worlds in it, and so updating with the second conjunct
will cause a crash.4
2 The centrality of the proposition
A central aspect of dynamic semantics is that the discourse, rather than the sentence,
is the primary object of semantic study. Following Yalcin (2013), call this discourse
primacy. The meanings of expressions are just what they contribute to a discourse.
Dynamic semantics takes the two-way interaction between sentence (or, really, ex-
pression) and context as another central semantic notion: expressions, by virtue of
their semantic contents being context change potentials, are both context-sensitive
and context-affecting. In this way, one of the central insights of dynamic seman-
tics is that information flows throughout a discourse, in the sense that something
introduced by one expression can be picked up by a later expression in the discourse.
Though I think it is right to say that taking these ideas as the central semantic notion
is indeed definitive of what it is to be a dynamic semantics, it is not as though static
semantics denies (nor should it deny) that information flows throughout a discourse,
that sentences are (at least sometimes) both context-sensitive and context-affecting,
or that they are building blocks in the meaning of a larger discourse.
What does it mean for a static semantics to accept that sentences are both
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context-sensitive and context-affecting, or, in other words, that sentences have CCPs?
This idea, after all, seems antithetical to static semantics. On a static semantics,
sentences can only have CCPs in a derivative sense, since it is utterances, not sen-
tences, that change the context. But we can talk about a sentence having a CCP in
the sense that an utterance of that sentence characteristically has a certain effect on
the context. For classical static semantics, the proposition or truth conditions is the
central semantic notion. Updates to the context are defined on, or at least highly
constrained by, the proposition expressed. Call this thesis proposition-centrality.5
When people talk of a notion of update for a static semantics, they invariably talk
about updating with the informational content (truth conditions) of the proposition
expressed. This is most commonly formally represented as update by intersection
on the context set. The context set contains the worlds that are open possibilities
for the purposes of the conversation; when a new proposition has been asserted and
accepted, its effect on this context is to eliminate all the worlds that conflict with it.
Just as static semantics need not eschew context change, dynamic semantics
need not (and does not) eschew propositions and truth conditions. For a dynamic
semantics, these are the derivative notions. Taking Heim’s basic case for example,
the proposition expressed can be derived from the update — it is the information
added to the context (truth conditional content can be similarly derived in the more
complex cases by tracking the information change to the context). In fact, it was
one of Heim’s aims in coming up with the account to give a unified explanation of
both the presupposition projection properties and the truth-conditional properties
of sentences. One can also derive truth-conditional content from updates that do
not simply involve intersecting sets of worlds. For example, in Dynamic Predicate
Logic (DPL),6 which was designed to account for the unbound anaphora data, an
existential quantifier changes the value of the variable associated with the quantifier.
For example, the indefinite (interpreted as existential quantifier) in (7a) makes the
context forget whatever it had previously assigned to, say, x, and outputs a context
in which the set of assignment functions are all the possible ones (that differ at most
from the input in what they assign to x) that assign x something in the interpretation
of woman and sat down. In this way, DPL records a new discourse referent in the
context. But this also yields the existential truth-conditional content, since the
update will only be successful in the case that there is at least one appropriate
individual in the model to assign to the variable.7 In fact, discourse primacy can
be a bit of a misleading thesis about dynamic semantics. While it is true that the
discourse is the primary semantic object, on a dynamic semantics expressions are
always interpreted incrementally (leaving open whether this is incremental according
to surface structure or logical form). Things later on in discourse can depend on
8
something earlier in discourse for their meaning, but never vice versa; it is not like we
need to interpret an entire discourse before we get content — even truth-conditional
content — for a smaller expression, though we do (generally) need to interpret the
earlier part of a discourse to get the truth-conditional content of a later part.
To take stock so far of the differences between static and dynamic semantics,
aside from what comes first and what is derivative, both can (and do) have a notion
of proposition, truth conditions, discourse-level informational content, and context
change potential. So the mere observation of order effects at the level of discourse, or
the observation that one sentence can introduce information that another picks up
on, is not sufficient for motivating dynamic semantics, as long as those order effects
can be accounted for by the interaction between the proposition expressed and the
context. For example, in the case of the order effects of presuppositions in (4), a static
semantics can give exactly the same explanation as a dynamic semantics, except it
appeals to the pragmatic update of the context rather than a semantic notion of
CCP. In (4a), the first sentence introduces the information that Claudia used to
smoke. If the proposition is accepted, its informational content gets added to the
context set. So when we get to the second sentence, the presupposition is satisfied.
But reverse the order of the sentences as in (4b), and the problem is predicted in the
same way as dynamic semantics does: the presupposition of the first sentence is not
satisfied.
However, whether something is taken as a primary or derivative notion does mat-
ter. First of all, dynamic semanticists don’t have to deny that sentences have truth
conditions or express propositions (in the derivative sense), but they can.8 Hence
dynamic semantics can easily accommodate updates from which no proposition or
truth-conditional content can be derived, such as (arguably) the tests of epistemic
modals. Second, dynamic semantics does not accept proposition-centrality, and so
has no problem more generally with non-truth-conditional updates, such as the in-
troduction of discourse referents by indefinites. In fact, especially in the anaphora
literature, this point is often used to motivate dynamic semantics, since it seems that
updating baed on truth-conditional content cannot distinguish between the felicity
and infelicity, respectively, of minimal pairs such as:
(13) Bryan owns a bicycle. It is grey.
(14) # Bryan is a bicycle-owner. It is grey.9
Finally, in the traditional picture of context change in static semantics, updates are
defined globally (the intersection of the proposition with the context). Not only does
defining them on propositions present prima facie problems for dealing with non-
truth-conditional update, but it also presents problems for sub-sentential updates.
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In dynamic semantics, context change is part of the recursive compositional calculus;
it does not discriminate between sub-sentential or cross-sentential context change;
recall that one innovation of dynamic semantics is defining merely local contexts that
are created during the processing of an expression and dismissed afterwards.
So if there is good evidence that non-truth-conditional updates are required, or
that sub-sentential update is required, does that mean it’s game over for static se-
mantics? Or is this at least very, very good evidence for dynamic semantics? Even
putting aside the vexed question of what counts as good evidence for non-truth-
conditional update or sub-sentential dynamics, the issue is still a lot more subtle
than this.10 Before I address this point, there is a related formal point often made
in the literature. Update by intersection has the property of being eliminative (also
known as introspective) and distributive (also know as continuous). When the con-
text is a set of points (whether these are worlds, assignment functions, etc.), an
update is eliminative just in case the output context is a subset of the input context:
Eliminativity: An update [φ] is eliminative iff for all contexts c, c[φ] ⊆ c
An update is distributive iff it works point-wise, that is, if updating each element
in the context separately and then taking the union of the result is equivalent to
updating the context as a whole:
Distributivity: An update [φ] is distributive iff for all contexts c, c[φ] =
⋃
i∈c{i}[φ]
So it is often said that a semantics is static just in case it is intersective, or elimi-
native and distributive (the original result is from van Benthem (1986), and is cited
by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991b), Gillies (2001), Dever (2006), Gillies and von
Fintel (2007), Dever (2013), Willer (2015), among others). It is tied to the idea of
the centrality of the proposition in static semantics, since if updates with proposi-
tions are performed by intersection, and update by intersection is eliminative and
distributive, then, the thought goes, non-eliminative and non-distributive updates
are not proposition-centric. The update encoded by indefinites (the introduction of
a new discourse referent) in DPL is an example of a non-eliminative update, since
‘∃x’ effectively resets what the assignment functions in the context assign to x. The
test encoded by ‘might’ is an example of a non-distributive update, since ♦φ tests
for a φ-world in the whole information state (which can’t be accomplished by testing
each point). So another question is: if there is good evidence that non-eliminative
or non-distributive updates are required (or at least, are by far the most elegant
way of doing things), is this evidence in favor of dynamic semantics? Again, I think
10
things are a lot more subtle than this, and static semantics can retain a lot of propo-
sition centrality even if the associated pragmatics involves some non-eliminative or
non-distributive updates.11
There are two things one could mean by proposition-centrality. First, that up-
dates to the context are always updates with the informational content of the propo-
sition. Second, that updates to the context are always updates based on the proposi-
tion expressed, but not necessarily updates with the informational content. In either
case, there is no reason to think update in a static system always has to be update by
intersection and therefore eliminative and distributive. Take the first case: suppose
all we ever update with is the informational content. Update by intersection is not an
arbitrary choice. It models the gaining of information, motivated by the Stalnakerian
idea that the goal of conversation, generally speaking, is inquiry, and that rational
agents like us will not keep open possibilities that conflict with something accepted
in the conversation. But inquiry into which world is the actual world is not the goal
of every conversation. For example, in a situation in which we are brainstorming,
we probably don’t want to eliminate possibilities as new ones are proposed, as the
propositions are offered tentatively, and we want the ability to potentially entertain
contradictory propositions at the same time. Or in the case in which we are merely
supposing, we might want to temporarily update with a proposition, but not perma-
nently alter the global context. At the very least, how the context gets updated can
depend on what a speaker is doing with a proposition, or the general sort of activity
that conversational participants are engaged in.
Second, and more interestingly, being proposition-centric and being truth-conditions-
centric are separable. We can define a system in which propositions are the basic
semantic unit, all updates are based on propositions expressed, but not all updates
are updates with the truth-conditional content of the proposition expressed. For
example, Stalnaker himself distinguishes between two effects of every assertion: the
essential effect, updating with the truth-conditional content expressed, and the com-
monplace effect, which involves updating with things like the fact that the speaker
is speaking, that the speaker spoke English, that the speaker said the words she
did, etc.12 This is an update based solely on the assertion of a proposition without
updating with the informational content. Of course, the commonplace effect doesn’t
require the assertion of a proposition (uttering a bunch of random words will also
have a commonplace effect), but it is an effect on the context of asserting a propo-
sition nevertheless (the essential effect doesn’t require the assertion of a proposition
either — it can be accomplished, for example, by a goat walking into the room).
Furthermore, there are other plausible, coherent, non-truth-conditional yet proposition-
centric updates. For example, in other work I have argued that the introduction of
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discourse referents can be pragmatically motivated (in fact should be, but that is a
story for another day). There is nothing in the static view of semantics that dic-
tates that contexts must be conceived as sets of worlds, or something equivalent.
Historically, a rich notion of context, especially one containing discourse referents,
is associated with dynamic semantics. Early theories of discourse anaphora, namely
Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), were the first to have a fully developed discourse
referent-based theory of the semantics of pronouns. But discourse referents, and
other discourse informational elements of context more generally, are logically in-
dependent from dynamic semantics. A static semantics can have a rich notion of
context, one just a rich as that of dynamic semantics.13 In particular, it can take
seriously the idea that the context must track discourse referents, and take seriously
that conversational participants track discourse referents to understand anaphoric
connections (and perhaps more) in conversation. Merely employing discourse refer-
ents in one’s theory does not reduce the centrality of the proposition.
In Lewis (2012, 2014), I motivate updates with new discourse referents consis-
tently with proposition-centrality. When a speaker asserts an existential proposition,
she has explicitly asserted the existence of some object. Since the set of discourse
referents in the context models the objects under discussion, what the speaker said
has to connect to the discourse referents in some way. If she had wanted to talk
about an existing discourse referent, she had good ways of doing so: using a name,
a demonstrative, a definite description, or a pronoun. So she must have intended
to talk about something new. Introducing something new in the conversation raises
the conversational participants’ expectations that someone will say something more
about it, and so it gets added to the set of discourse referents. What distinguishes
assertions of things like (13) from (14) is that the former, but not the latter, is a
good indication of a speaker’s plan to potentially go on and say something further
about a bicycle. As in dynamic semantics, the existence of an appropriate discourse
referent licenses anaphoric pronouns and provides a value for them. The update is
the same non-eliminative update we get in DPL and other dynamic semantics for
anaphora (exactly how the update is realized formally depends on how one chooses to
model discourse referents, but, for example, if we model them as sets of assignment
functions following DPL, the update looks exactly the same). But the explanation
for why the update occurs is proposition-centric: it is derived from broadly Gricean
reasoning based on the fact that the speaker has asserted an existential proposition.14
I do not have the space to fully defend this view here or compare its merits to dy-
namic semantics, but this is not the point. The point is that it is well within the
reach of static systems to have coherent, pragmatically motivated, non-eliminative,
non-truth-conditional updates and remain proposition-centric. The point is also not
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that this is the only or the best static alternative to account for the anaphora data;
the most popular static alternatives, d-type theories of pronouns, do not overtly ap-
peal to updates to the context or discourse referents, so their relative merits are best
left for another discussion. However, it should be noted that the view I’ve outlined
above is compatible with a d-type semantics for pronouns.15
What about non-distributive updates like the one for ‘might’? On a proposition-
centric, static view, we cannot get away with exactly what Veltman has — no truth
conditions at all, merely a test on the context. But it is fairly straightforward
to motivate the same non-distributive update based on a standard contextualist
semantics for ‘might’. On the standard view, an utterance of ‘might φ’ expresses the
proposition that φ is compatible with some contextually relevant body of information.
The first thing to note is that we don’t need non-distributive updates to get an
accurate representation of the context set or to explain the order effects (though
we may need them for other reasons). In cases where a speaker speaks truly when
asserting might φ, φ will be an open possibility according to the context set of the
conversation, since unless we are in a defective context, if φ is compatible with
some contextually relevant body of information, it will also be an open possibility
according to the context. Updating with the propositional content of might φ will
eliminate any worlds in which φ is not compatible with the contextually relevant
body of information in that world, but will leave the φ-worlds in the context set that
are compatible with the contextually relevant body of information in that world.
So insofar as what is desired for an accurate representation of the context set after
might φ has been uttered is that it is one that contains some φ-worlds, ordinary
intersective update with an off-the-shelf contextualist semantics will do the job. This
is also sufficient for explaining the order effects like those displayed in (11). In (11a),
the context is first updated with the information that it is compatible with (say)
the speaker’s knowledge that Mary Anne is at the door. After the door is opened to
reveal Kristy, the context is further updated with the information that Mary Anne
is not at the door. But in (11b), we first get the information that Mary Anne is not
at the door, so there are no Mary Anne at the door-worlds in the context set. So it
is not compatible with the speaker’s knowledge (or anyone else’s in the conversation)
that Mary Anne is at the door.
But what about the idea that underlies the dynamic semantic treatment of
‘might’, which on many incarnations has less to do with the context set than the
intentional states of the conversational participants? As Veltman (1996) writes:
The idea behind the analysis of ‘might’ is this: One has to agree to might
φ if φ is consistent with one’s knowledge — or rather with what one takes
to be one’s knowledge. Otherwise might φ is to be rejected. (p.227)
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This is the motivation behind the non-distributive test. But the same update can
be motivated based on the proposition expressed — when someone asserts that φ is
compatible with some contextually relevant body of knowledge, it is only natural for
the hearer(s) to check if φ is also compatible with their knowledge.16 So a hearer can
accept that what a speaker expressed with an utterance of might φ as true (say that
φ is compatible with the speaker’s knowledge) without wanting to accept might φ
for herself.17 Representing this check on an agent’s intentional state just is the non-
distributive test to see if there is a φ-world. This is not to argue that static semantics
plus pragmatics can do everything dynamic semantics can when it comes to modals;
for instance, I have said nothing here about Yalcin’s data regarding embedding under
supposition.18 Rather, again, this is to show that non-distributive updates are no
obstacle to proposition-centrality.
These are not the only cases in which we can define non-intersective, non-truth-
conditional updates to the context while keeping propositions as the basic, central
semantic object. In other work,19 I have argued that the pragmatic effect of coun-
terfactual conditionals is to change which worlds are relevant for the truth value
of subsequent counterfactuals (and this is not accomplished merely by eliminating
formerly relevant worlds; most often more worlds are added).20 There are theories
that take questions under discussion as something that the context tracks;21 in this
case ordinary assertions can affect the set of questions under discussion in various
ways. This is, again, not to argue here that static semantics plus pragmatics can do
everything that dynamic semantics can do — this would take a much more extensive
argument and detailed examination of all the data than there is room for in this
paper. Rather, the point is, one can have a proposition-centric, static view with
a much more complex relationship to updating the context than most people give
it credit for. The focus on informational-update only and along with it the formal
properties of eliminativity and distributivity is misguided.
Recall that there was a second challenge to proposition-centrality. What happens
if it turns out we need sub-sentential updates? In this case, the updates (intersective
or otherwise) are not something that occur after the semantic value for an entire
sentence has been calculated, but contribute to that very calculation. If we need sub-
sentential updates, then at the very least, some of the centrality of the proposition
is lost, since some of the updates will not be based on a proposition expressed since
they occur prior to the proposition being calculated. In all of the central cases for
dynamic semantics, like presupposition, anaphora, and epistemic modals, there are
cases of embedded phenomena. Historically speaking, when it comes to anaphora and
presupposition, some of the basic data has always been sub-sentential. Furthermore,
an increasing amount and complexity of sub-sentential data that seems to speak
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in favor of a dynamic semantics (or something close to it) has been raised in the
literature, such as Yalcin’s data for epistemic modals, to name just one case. The
sub-sentential data often presents a deeper challenge to the static picture, since even
if one thinks that pragmatic principles can explain discourse dynamics, it is a different
story when that dynamics is a part of the recursive compositional process.
Of course, it is always an option to argue that sub-sentential dynamics are not
necessary, and contrary to superficial appearances, the sub-sentential data is impor-
tantly different from the cross-sentential data. But supposing we do accept sub-
sentential updates, there are at least three ways we can think of how this affects
proposition-centrality. First, one might think that this is a significant enough de-
parture from the static picture to count as dynamic, since something dynamic goes
on at the level of semantic composition. (Or, because there doesn’t have to be a
sharp line between static and dynamic semantics, we can think that this is more
dynamic than a purely static account, but not a fully dynamic system.) On the
other hand, one might think that as long as the compositional process results in an
ordinary, static proposition, we have not abandoned the core of the static picture
or proposition-centrality. (This is arguably the position of Paul Dekker (2012), who
thinks that composition is dynamic, but meanings are static.) Finally, one might
think that as long as the sub-sentential updates are also motivated pragmatically
and the result of the compositional process is a proposition, we have not abandoned
the core of the static picture.22 There are two more things to be said for this last
option. First is that if the sub-sentential updates can be motivated on the basis of
assertion-like speech acts, this maintains even more proposition-centrality. This is
roughly the strategy of Stalnaker (2010) in his pragmatic account of presupposition.
This is easiest to motivate in the case of conjunction, since when a speaker asserts
anything of the form ‘A and B’, by the time she gets to the ‘and’, the audience
knows that she is committed to A, no matter what B is. Since speech is processed
incrementally, this also accounts for the order effects involving conjunction without
making conjunction logically non-commutative. In the case of conditionals, Stalnaker
proposes that the speaker has supposed the antecedent, which induces a temporary
update on the context. On the other hand, given that it is consistent with the static
picture (though perhaps not the classical static picture) to have pragmatic intrusion
of all sorts, one might think that any pragmatically motivated update, not neces-
sarily ones that mimic assertion-based updates, are kosher on a static view. This
seems to be the position of Philippe Schlenker on presupposition, who argues for
the creation of local contexts based on both broadly Gricean and general process-
ing considerations.23 This is not to say, however, that either of these strategies are
successful. Stalnaker’s theory has been criticized as insufficiently general24, and the
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status of (some of) Schlenker’s rules as genuinely pragmatic is questionable.
The foregoing discussion might leave one wondering what good evidence for a
dynamic semantic framework would look like. Evidence that updates to the con-
text, whether cross-sentential or sub-sentential, are not pragmatically motivated, or
that we need to take context change potential rather than propositions as basic to
account for certain logical features of language, like entailments, are all good evi-
dence. That is, evidence of context-change-centrality or discourse primacy rather
than proposition-centrality is good evidence for dynamic semantics. The main moral
of the above discussion is that proposition-centrality is indeed a useful way of char-
acterizing static frameworks, keeping in mind that this is neither proposed as a
necessary nor sufficient condition. But the association of proposition-centrality
with merely truth-conditional update, update by intersection, and the properties
of eliminativity and distributivity is best abandoned. Non-truth-conditional, non-
eliminative, and non-distributive updates can all be pragmatically motivated while
keeping propositions as the central semantic notion. All this seems to bring us right
to the vexed issue of the semantics/pragmatics distinction and its relationship to
dynamic semantics, which will be the topic of the next section.
3 Dynamic semantics and semantics/pragmatics
distinction
It is my contention that the central difference between a static framework and a
dynamic one is whether updates to the context (i.e. discourse dynamics) are ac-
counted for by pragmatics or semantics. Call this the semantics-pragmatics thesis.25
Semantics describes facts about conventionally encoded meaning, or the content of
an expression at a context in accordance with its conventionally encoded meaning (in
the case of context-sensitivity). I take this to be a fairly common way of conceiving of
semantics. I am thinking of pragmatics as an explanation of what gets communicated
or what otherwise goes on in discourse based on the fact that conversations are (typ-
ically) joint activities among (generally speaking) rational agents. While I don’t take
this to be an uncontroversial definition of pragmatics, I take it to be representative of
a Gricean tradition, very broadly construed. These definitions are neutral between
a dynamic and static semantics in the sense that they allow for either framework
to be in theory a correct characterization of semantics, as opposed to, for example,
a definition of semantics in terms of truth conditions or involving the absence of
context-sensitivity, which would by definition exclude dynamic semantics.26
It seems unquestionable that there is something dynamic that goes on in dis-
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course, and that linguistic interpretation has an important two-way connection to
context (though we can certainly question the extent of the dynamics in particular
cases). As we’ve seen, in the case of a dynamic semantics, context change is the cen-
tral semantic notion; in a static semantics, context change is defined on propositions,
which are the central semantic notion. Call the latter a static semantics with dynamic
pragmatics.27 Let me say a little more about what I mean by a dynamic pragmatics.
In a dynamic pragmatics, updates to the context are explained by broadly prag-
matic considerations: the rationality of agents, the purpose of conversation, etc. I
take Stalnaker’s explanation of update by intersection to be an example of dynamic
pragmatics par excellence. Again, on his view, when someone asserts a proposition,
if it is accepted, its effect on the context set is modeled by intersection because the
purpose of conversation is generally inquiry, and it is irrational for the conversational
participants, when engaged in such an activity, to keep open possibilities that conflict
with what they have just accepted. Hence we have ordinary, static, sets of worlds
propositions as the central semantic notion, and update to the context explained by
these general pragmatic principles. By contrast, when we look at dynamic seman-
tics, even basic intersective updates are no longer explained by appealing to general
pragmatic principles. For example, as Schlenker (2011a) points out, when it comes
to dynamic semantics, even in Heim’s basic, intersective system, “the ‘context set’
became a technical notion, with no claim that the speech act participants literally
believe local contexts (i.e. local context sets)” (p.852).
The semantics-pragmatics thesis seems to be threatened by a view commonly
expressed in conversation, though less commonly articulated in print, that dynamic
semantics does away with the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. It is
not always clear what people mean by this. I will explore what they could possi-
bly mean by this and what these various interpretations imply for the fate of the
semantics-pragmatics thesis. I will argue that the thesis holds for at least a signifi-
cant, mainstream body of work that goes under the heading “dynamic semantics”.
From the outset, it should be noted that no one presumably means that dynamic
semantics completely gets rid of the semantics/pragmatics distinction. I know of
no dynamic semanticist who thinks that classic examples of particularized implica-
tures should not be distinguished from semantics. No dynamic semanticist gives a
semantic explanation of why Grice’s famous example of the letter of recommendation
implicates that Mr. X is not a good philosopher or that why saying of B that he
“hasn’t been to jail yet” when asked about his new job implicates something about
his personality (or the nature of his job). The alleged blurring of the distinction
has to do with the kinds of phenomena that are closer to the penumbra between
semantics and pragmatics.
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One thing that could be meant when saying that dynamic semantics blurs the
distinction is that what semantics really should be focused on is conversation, linguis-
tic communication, or linguistic interpretation in general and treating these things
in a formal, systematic, and empirically accurate way. Whether certain aspects of
linguistic interpretation best go under the headings “semantics” or “pragmatics”
doesn’t really matter for the project. If this is really what is going on, then the
semantics-pragmatics thesis is in some trouble, since it’s not clear we can even make
sense of it. Furthermore, if this is right, perhaps static and dynamic semantics are
not competing frameworks, but compatible, distinct projects that both happen to
go under the heading “semantics”. There is still the interesting question of which
is the more fruitful project, or the one that is best to be engaged in if we want a
better understanding of language, but they are not incompatible, and it is possible
that they are both fruitful in their own ways. On this picture, static semantics is the
project of investigating what is conventionally encoded in language, or what is ‘hard-
wired’ into language, and what meanings support indefeasible entailments between
sentences. By contrast, dynamic semantics investigates more-or-less systematic fea-
tures of conversation, like the treatment of variables, presuppositions, and contextual
information, whether they are conventionally encoded or derived from more general
considerations.
Perhaps there are some people out there who think this.28 I do take this to be a
genuine worry about the conceptual difference between static and dynamic semantics
espoused by the semantics-pragmatics thesis. There are two ways we can think of
this take on dynamic semantics. The first is that the project of dynamic semantics is
an important stepping stone, but not ultimately the correct framework. If updates
are genuinely pragmatically motivated, then the semantics and pragmatics are sep-
arable and we could likely get away with a static notion of meaning and pragmatics
working alongside it. That is to say, once we discover more about pragmatics, the
innovations of dynamic semantics will turn out to have pragmatic underpinnings,
and we will be able to incorporate important features of dynamic semantics in a
static semantics with a dynamic pragmatics. In this way, dynamic semantics is an
indispensable project, because it gives us tools for a systematic account of discourse
data without worrying about the theoretical underpinnings, but a temporary one on
the path to a static semantics/dynamic pragmatics. The semantics-pragmatics thesis
stands as a thesis about the difference between static and dynamic semantics as end
goal rather than means, but not as a thesis about the difference between static and
dynamic semantics as means to an end. On the other hand, it is possible that once
the semantics and pragmatics are separated, the static semantic meanings we are left
with look nothing like propositions or, in the case of sub-sentential expressions, con-
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tributions to propositions. That is, semantics and pragmatics are inextricably linked
in such a way that it doesn’t make much sense to separate them. Part of this may
derive from discovering that typical updates to the context are partly pragmatically
derived but partly conventional at the same time. In this case, perhaps we could still
have a static semantics with a pragmatics that works alongside it, but it would not
look much like our classic view of static semantics, and probably wouldn’t be of much
interest as a distinct view from dynamic semantics. This is the worst case scenario
for the semantics-pragmatics thesis, because in this scenario we have good reason to
think a significant portion of discourse dynamics is pragmatic, but nevertheless we
should maintain a dynamic framework, so it doesn’t make sense to distinguish static
and dynamic semantics in terms of the role of pragmatics in explaining discourse
dynamics.
In reality, however, for the most part this sort of position doesn’t appear to
be the position held by the people actually doing dynamic semantics. I am not
aware of anyone in the literature who explicitly holds anything like this (aside from
perhaps David Beaver, whose position I will return to below). It is possible that
different people all working under the heading of “dynamic semantics” are actually
doing different things, but if a significant number are doing what we would (more
or less) traditionally call semantics as I’ve outlined it above, then the semantics-
pragmatics thesis is unaffected for at least this significant body of work in dynamic
semantics. There is no indication that those working in dynamic semantics are
incorporating anything they think of as genuinely pragmatic into the semantics, and
many indications that they are treating the phenomena as semantic. Consider for
contrast work on embedded implicatures, which is about how and whether pragmatics
should be integrated into semantics, in the sense that it should be part of the intuitive
literal content of a sentence or expression, or part of the recursive compositional
calculus that yields that content. For example, it has long been noted that things
like scalar implicatures and consequential ‘and’ appear to embed in constructions
like disjunctions, conditionals, and under attitude verbs. For example:
(15) If I give some of my students an extension, the others will be upset.
(16) (The party won’t turn out well for me.) Either I’ll get drunk and no one will
talk to me, or no one will talk to me and I’ll get drunk. (Examples from
Simons (2011), p.611-12)
In a series of papers, Mandy Simons (2010, 2011, 2013) has argued that general
Gricean considerations can apply at a sub-sentential level, and so we can give a neo-
Gricean explanation of such examples, incorporating pragmatically conveyed mate-
rial into the literal content of the sentence. The details are not important for the
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present point; the idea is that this is an example of what integrating genuinely prag-
matic features with semantics looks like — it involves showing how general pragmatic
principles apply at the sub-sentential level. The enrichment of the content at a local
level is explained by appealing to general features of discourse and the rationality of
the conversational participants.29 30
By contrast, in the dynamic semantics literature, there is no appeal to the in-
corporation of pragmatics in the recursive compositional calculus. What does the
work in explaining the discourse dynamics observed in presupposition projection,
anaphora, epistemic modals, conditionals and more is written into the semantic
clauses of the operators, connectives, and atomic formulae, as we saw in the ex-
amples above in §1. These are appeals to the conventionally encoded meanings of
these expressions, not general considerations about rationality or conversation, and
certainly not locally calculated implicatures. If they did appeal to such general
considerations, the sort of criticisms levied against pragmatic approaches to presup-
position projection would be inappropriate. Both Stalnaker and Schlenker’s appeals
to pragmatic principles have been criticized as insufficiently general; if dynamic se-
mantics was the result of encoding the same pragmatic principles in a formal system,
it would have little to stand on in its criticism. In a similar way, the novelty and
familiarity conditions on indefinite and definite expressions, respectively, is not a
matter of reasoning about the meaning of of the indefinite or definite expression,
rather it is a matter of convention. For example, in Heim’s File Change Semantics,
the Novelty-Familiarity condition31 is explicitly stipulated, not derived from more
general consideration about rationality. Of course, the context change rule associ-
ated with indefinites and definites (that the former add new discourse referents and
the latter update old ones) don’t need to be also stipulated — they fall out of the
novelty-familiarity condition and how the contexts work. But these also don’t appeal
to considerations involving rational agents engaged in communicative activity.
However, this is not to say that Heim’s view or that of any other dynamic seman-
tics can’t or don’t have anything to do with rationality (or, at least, more than arbi-
trary convention). Some dynamic traditions, particularly those inspired by Kamp’s
Discourse Representation Theory,32 are in the business of doing semantics qua theory
of both meaning-form relation and theory of processing or cognition more generally;
different implementations take this relationship more or less seriously. The question
of how much dynamic semantics relates to processing and how processing relates to
semantics and pragmatics is a difficult one, one that deserves consideration at more
length than I have room for here, and so I put the question aside for now.33
Despite this historical connection to processing, however it is to be taken, a
large swath of mainstream dynamic semantics doesn’t seem to work in that tradi-
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tion (or, that tradition plays no obvious role). In fact, what inspired Groenendijk
and Stokhof’s DPL, one of the earliest dynamic semantics, was creating a semantics
inspired by Kamp’s DRT, but that explicitly incorporates compositionality and elim-
inates the connection to mental representation. Groenendijk and Stokhof’s work, like
other early work in dynamic semantics (e.g. Muskens (1991)), emphasizes the notion
of meaning as state change in order to account for recalcitrant data (in this case,
unbound anaphora) and doing so by employing compositional semantic frameworks
(like Montague semantics), rather than on any connection with mental cognition or
rationality. In the course of considerable discussion of the motivations for the frame-
work, there is no discussion of dynamic semantics being a placeholder for what will
ultimately be accounted for by pragmatics. Rather there is much discussion of static
notions of semantics not being able to account for certain kinds of linguistic data.
Much work in dynamic semantics stems from this tradition.
Another point in favor of the interpretation that dynamic semantics is in the
business of accounting for conventionally encoded meaning is that a large part of
what motivates the inclusion of CCPs at the level of semantic clauses is accounting
for various entailment relations. On the dynamic semantic view, these entailments are
not the defeasible entailments of something like Stalnaker’s reasonable inference but
true entailments. For example, Beaver (2001) writes when introducing his dynamic
system:
I will attempt to follow a long standing tradition of philosophers and
semanticists. The data will consist of implications between sentences of
natural language, and to account for the data I will define logics which
yield these implications as entailments between formulae, combined with
a general way of translating from natural language into the logic. (p.143)
Some dynamic semanticists explicitly appeal to to the fact that dynamics are
found at the sub-sentential level as evidence that they are genuinely semantic phe-
nomena. This reflects that these dynamic semanticists do not view their own project
as incorporating pragmatic elements into semantics, for if they did, the argument
that there is no pragmatic motivation for the intra-sentential phenomena would not
be relevant. For example Adrian Brasoveanu (ms) writes:
Intra-sentential donkey anaphora to structure provides a much stronger
argument for the idea that plural info states are semantically necessary.
To see this consider anaphora to value first: a pragmatic account is plau-
sible for cases of cross-sentential anaphora (e..g in A man came in. He sat
down, the pronoun he can be taken to refer to whatever man is pragmat-
ically brought to salience by the use of an indefinite in the first sentence),
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but less plausible for cases of intra-sentential donkey anaphora (no par-
ticular donkey is brought to salience in Every farmer who owns a donkey
beats it. (p.5-6, emphasis in original)34
If dynamic semantics is right, we can say that some things we used to think of as
pragmatic, like presupposition or cross-sentential anaphora, actually turn out to be
semantic. But this is not blurring semantics and pragmatics. This is a discovery
that something formerly thought to be pragmatic is semantic.
Beaver (2001, 2002) is the best candidate for an exception to what I’ve been
arguing. For example, in Beaver (2002) he writes that “nobody should be serious
in thinking that what goes under the term dynamic semantics is just semantics”
(p.191), and goes on to define a framework called Transition Preference Pragmatics
that obviates the need to pre-index anaphors and antecedents. In Beaver (2001), he
writes:
I propose a way in which the CCP account of sentence presupposition may
be formally combined with an account of the inferential processes which
hearers use when determining the assumptions of the speaker. (p.138)
Both the 2001 and the 2002 accounts are a way of modeling a conversational par-
ticipant’s uncertainty about what actual change to the context has been induced by
a speaker’s particular utterance. It is clear that Beaver incorporates both genuinely
semantic and genuinely pragmatic features into a single system. But in actuality,
there is no blurring of the semantics/pragmatics distinction; his system has a clear
semantic component and a clear pragmatic component. What he has, essentially, is
both a dynamic semantics and a dynamic pragmatics. His basic semantic clauses are
functions from contexts to contexts (states to states), motivated by such classically
semantic features as entailments between sentences, and common arguments for dy-
namic semantics, like the non-commutativity of conjunction. To model uncertainty,
he then introduces the notion of an information set, which is a set of information
states (ordered in terms of preference by common sense). Updates to information
sets are functions from CCPs to information sets. The update to the information
set does involve pragmatics, but it is defined on top of the existing semantic notion
of a CCP.35 A potential argument in favor of dynamic semantics is that this kind
of interface is difficult or impossible to have in a system that combines static se-
mantics and dynamic pragmatics. This is an interesting project for future research,
and if this suggestion is right, there may be good reason for maintaining a dynamic
semantics even if it turns out that much of the explanation for discourse dynamics
is pragmatic.
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What I think people mean when they say dynamic semantics blurs the seman-
tics/pragmatics distinction is something closer to this: dynamic semantics deals with
issues of use of language, not just truth conditions. At its most basic level, the tradi-
tional distinction between semantics and pragmatics has it that semantics deals with
the relationship between linguistic expressions and the objects for which they stand,
while pragmatics deals with the relationship between linguistic expressions and their
use, or expressions and their interpreters. In dynamic semantics, the objects that
linguistic expressions stand for are context change potentials, and contexts involve
some representation of the state of conversations, which often have something to
do with the intentional states of the conversational participants. The old way of
dividing things up clearly no longer works when it comes to dynamic semantics.
There are also some people who think of semantics as the project of assigning truth-
evaluable contents to sentences (and their contribution to truth-evaluable contents
to sub-sentential expressions) and leave the effect those contents have on the be-
liefs of the speakers to pragmatics. Again, on this way of dividing things up, the
semantics/pragmatics distinction is clearly blurred in dynamic semantics.
All this may be true, but it doesn’t affect the kind of semantics/pragmatics
distinction at play in the semantics-pragmatics thesis above, nor does it affect a
terribly interesting notion of the semantics/pragmatics distinction. The seman-
tics/pragmatics distinction at play in the semantics-pragamtics thesis is one where
pragmatic explanations are motivated by general principles about human rationality
and the purpose of conversation. By contrast, semantic explanations are about what
is conventionally encoded, about what supports entailment relations, about what
gets into the recursive compositional calculus, about what a competent language
user has to know to know a language. It is these latter things that dynamic seman-
tics is interested in; it is these latter things that according to dynamic semantics,
context change potentials are all about. Rather than blur the semantics/pragmatics
distinction in an interesting way, what dynamic semantics does is show us our basic
semantics/pragmatics distinction in terms of expression-object relation and use is
just not good enough. Dynamic semantics abstracts away from concrete situations
of use and deals in general, (allegedly) systematic patterns of interaction with con-
text. This abstraction away from specific situations of use, the focus on universal,




An interesting question, then, is whether there is good evidence, in either direction,
that updates to the context are a hard-wired matter of semantic competence or better
explained by appeal to general principles of rationality. I’ve argued that bad evidence
for dynamic semantics includes order effects, the two-way interaction between con-
text and content, and non-distributive or non-eliminative updates to the context. All
these, on their own, equally support a dynamic semantics or a static semantics with
a dynamic pragmatics. Some good evidence in favor of dynamic semantics would
include evidence that these discourse dynamics are not best explained pragmatically,
that they support indefeasible entailments, or that they are needed for sub-sentential
composition in a way that cannot be explained by appeal to sub-sentential pragmat-
ics. On the other hand, good evidence in favor of a static semantics is that there is
not as much true dynamics (i.e. context change) in discourse as meets the eye, that
discourse dynamics are best explained by appeal to general pragmatic principles, or
that it is best to keep updates to the context separate from the semantics.36
Notes
1Though Heim’s semantics is by no means universally accepted among dynamic semanticists,
views in this basic Heimian tradition have been quite popular since its introduction. For example,
see Heim (1992), Chierchia (1995), Beaver (2001), and Rothschild (2011). For a dynamic semantics
in the spirit of Heim that takes contexts to be stacks of states instead of sets of worlds, see Zeevat
(1992). For criticisms of Heim’s approach see Soames (1989), Geurts (1999), Schlenker (2007,
2008a,b, 2009, 2011a,b).
2For dynamic semantic accounts of anaphora see Heim (1982), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990),
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991a), Muskens (1991), Chierchia (1995), Groenendijk et al. (1996),
Beaver (2001), Heim (2002), Brasoveanu (2008, 2011).
3These same clauses serve to explain some embedding data in Beaver (2001), though accounting
for embeddings gets considerably more complex in Dever (2013).
4This is a very rough overview. On Yalcin’s semantics, modals are (static) restrictions of the
information state rather than tests. For further illumination on the connection between Yalcin’s
semantics and dynamic semantics, see Klinedinst and Rothschild (2012), Willer (2015), and Roth-
schild (ms) (http://dynsem.github.io/vy.html).
5Dever (2006) calls this propositional determination of pragmatic effects or PDPE. As he notes:
A semantics can be static even without the PDPE, but the interest of the statics
decrease (sic.) as violations of the PDPE increase. The ideal Static picture would
have additional forces flowing from the proposition expressed. (p.6)
6See Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991a).
7Like many dynamic semantics, DPL defines truth as successful update. I will be putting aside
the interesting question of in what sense these are equivalent notions.
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8I am ignoring here that there is an important sense in which static semanticists can do so as
well. For example, classic expressivists have a static semantic picture without truth conditions or
propositions.
9For example, see Heim (1982) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991a).
10For a good discussion of the complexities involved in deciding whether a piece of linguistic data
counts as evidence of truly dynamic features see Rothschild and Yalcin (2015).
11There are many problems with using eliminativity and distributivity as the defining features of
a static system, which are pointed out most clearly by Rothschild and Yalcin (2015). They define a
system as strongly static iff it is isomorphic to some intersective system, appealing to the properties
of idempotence and commutativity as the key properties of a strongly static system, which, unlike
eliminativity and distributivity, are clearly defined regardless of the technical details of a system.
The considerations in Rothschild and Yalcin (2015) are different from the ones in this paper, though
not entirely unrelated.
12Stalnaker (1978)
13But see Dever (2006) for worries about whether updating rich contexts solely based on the
proposition is feasible.
14Full disclosure: we need to appeal to the maxim of manner to distinguish existential propositions
from truth-conditional equivalents unless structured propositions are used. See Lewis (2012, 2014)
for more details of the view.
15D-type or e-type theory of pronouns take pronouns to go proxy for definite descriptions like the
woman who walked in or simply the woman. (See for example, Evans (1977), Neale (1990), Heim
(1990), Elbourne (2005).) These views, as I said, do not explicitly invoke discourse referents; in fact
they are often viewed as the sort of account we should adopt if we want to eschew discourse referents.
Furthermore, they do not explicitly engage in a discussion of updates to the context; on the d-type
view, the solution to the problem of unbound anaphora is one that focuses on the semantics of
pronouns rather than the flow of information through a discourse. However, d-type theories are far
from mutually exclusive from theories involving discourse referents. In general, discourse referents
can be fruitfully combined with a d-type semantics for pronouns: for explaining when pronouns
are and are not licensed, for co-indexing a pronoun with the correct antecedent (especially in cases
of indistinguishable participants), and for providing the right descriptive information for a d-type
theory (or otherwise providing a value for the description). (See Lewis (2013) for arguments that d-
type theories need to be supplemented with discourse referents; see Schlenker (2013) for arguments
that Elbourne’s d-type account smuggles in the notion of discourse referents.) Some static accounts
that are not d-type accounts include a notion of update, like that proposed by Stalnaker (1998).
Stalnaker appeals to the referential intentions of speakers as what grounds how the context is
updated for the purposes of tracking anaphoric pronouns; his notion of context remains that of
common ground, and the update is still eliminative. Dekker (2004) and van Rooij (2001) both
argue for (more or less) static accounts that incorporate discourse referents, but they also want to
ground the notion of a discourse referent in the referential intentions of speakers. (For arguments
against these referential intentions views, see Lewis (2013).) Sam Cumming employs discourse
referents in the semantics of indefinites and pronouns within a static framework; though he is
not particularly concerned with updates to the context, an extension of his system that included
a robust account of how context interacts with content could potentially include non-eliminative
updates for discourse referents based on the content of a sentence containing an indefinite (see
Cumming (2013, 2014, 2015)).
16This is reminiscent of the intuition behind relativism for epistemic modals, though against
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relativism for epistemic modals in that relativists would generally deny that it is possible to agree
with the truth of might φ when φ is not compatible with one’s own knowledge. It would be
straightforward to motivate the non-distributive update on a relativist semantics.
17There is some experimental evidence that offers prima facie support for a view along these lines.
The experiments in Knobe and Yalcin (2014) reveal that people tend to more often judge epistemic
modal statements as true than false when they are in a more informed position than the speaker,
such that they know that the prejacent is false. But more interestingly for present purposes, they
are also much more likely to judge that it is appropriate for the speaker to retract what she said if
she comes to learn this information than that what she said was false. This suggests two things that
support a view like the one sketched here: 1) that the conversational effects of a modal sentence
should be kept separate from their truth or falsity and 2) that epistemic modal claims do have
propositional content, as people tend to have fairly robust intuitions about their truth or falsity.
18For a defense of the standard contextualist theory of epistemic modals against Yalcin’s data,
see Dowell (ming). For a non-standard static semantics of epistemic modals that deals with data,
see Moss (2015).
19See Lewis (2016).
20See von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) for arguments in favor of a dynamic semantics for
counterfactual conditionals. See Moss (2012) for arguments against these accounts.
21See for example Roberts (2004).
22As Daniel Rothschild (p.c.) noted, we might also think that if we have dynamic sub-sentential
semantics with propositions as the result of the compositional process, then we have a dynamic
semantics without discourse primacy.
23See Schlenker (2007, 2008a,b, 2009, 2011a,b).
24See Dever (2013), Rothschild (2011), and Schlenker (2009, 2011a).
25This conception of the difference between dynamic and static semantics is most explicitly also
espoused by Dever (2013), but is also present in Yalcin (2013) and the work of Philippe Schlenker
on presupposition already cited in this paper.
26Martin Stokhof (2014) worries that this sort of characterization of the difference is never going
to work because we will be unable to characterize semantics and pragmatics in such a way that
is both theory-neutral and sufficiently restrictive to decide between the two views. The above
definition is supposed to be theory-neutral in that both static and dynamic semanticists generally
accept that some phenomena are accounted for by theories of the first kind and some are accounted
for by theories of the second. The characterizations themselves are not supposed to decide between
the theories, rather it takes a lot of subtle examination of the data and explanations for the data
to determine which category the data falls into.
27This term is sometimes used in slightly different ways in the literature. But it is defined this
way by Dever (2013), Stalnaker (2014), and my Lewis (2014), among others.
28Daniel Rothschild (p.c.) tells me he thinks this — that dynamic semantics may be seen as
a system for providing descriptive accounts of linguistic phenomena as a placeholder for a future
pragmatic story.
29Simons sometimes appeals to a dynamic semantics as the semantic framework best suited to
incorporate local enrichment. This may turn out to be right: since dynamic semantics is good at
creating local contexts, it is also a useful tool for incorporating pragmatic information composi-
tionally. But this is not the blurring of semantics and pragmatics; rather, it is because dynamic
semantics semantically motivates this kind of sub-sentential structure that it can incorporate the
pragmatics more easily. If the construction of local contexts themselves were pragmatically moti-
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vated, then we wouldn’t need the dynamic semantic framework to account for local enrichment of
content.
30Others who focus on incorporating pragmatics at the sub-sentential level include relevance
theorists, like Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Carston (2002), and proponents of truth-conditional
pragmatics, like Recanati (2010).
31I.e. If a particular index (discourse referent) is associated with an indefinite, it cannot already
be in the context, and an index associated with a definite has to already be in the context.
32See Kamp (1981), Kamp and Reyle (1993).
33One of many questions this raises is how to classify Schlenker’s later work on presupposition
that appeals primarily to processing facts and not really to general Gricean reasoning.
34In other work, Brasoveanu also uses the argument that certain readings of sentences are only
correctly predicted given a dynamic semantic account, and not a pragmatic account, e.g. Brasoveanu
(2008), p.133, and Brasoveanu (2011), p.1036-7.
35As he himself remarks:
...[A] model of the semantics-pragmatics interface has been proposed which allows
both common-sense reasoning and semantic content to determine the information
which a hearer derives from a particular utterance. Thus I have not gone so far as
Hobbs, in that common sense reasoning does not determine content in the model I
have developed. But I have show a way in which a mechanism operating very much in
the spirit of Hobbs’ proposals can be built on top of a compositional theory of meaning.
(p. 249, emphasis mine.)
He says something similar in the 2002 paper: “Here’s the big picture. Or at least a big picture.
Syntactic analysis and compositional interpretation, yield a set of alternative meaning. Each mean-
ing is itself a set of transitions, i.e., pairs of information states conceived of as input and outputs,
where an information state is one possible common ground. What do we need pragmatics for? The
main reason we need it is to choose the right single transition, the one intended by the speaker,
from amongst the set of sets of transitions provided by earlier stages of interpretation.” (p.200)
36E.g. see Stalnaker (2014) and the introduction to Stalnaker (1999) for arguments in favor of
this last point.
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